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It is not especially controversial to assert, at least as a broadly desirable objective, that the principles 
of the common law of torts should have a role to play in protecting vulnerable people.1 But immediate 
difficulty is likely when we start to consider what this proposition may mean in practice and how exactly 
the objective may come to be achieved. The common law courts seek to lay down rules and principles 
of general application. They do not have the same ability or the same freedom as legislatures have to 
craft detailed rules that can be expressed to apply specifically to defined (and, maybe, deserving) 
claimants.2 But the courts nonetheless are able to bring into account the notion of vulnerable persons 
as a class or category of claimant or of defendant, and in this way may accord them special treatment 
when resolving disputed issues of liability. The concern of this paper is with the former of these 
categories, that is, plaintiffs who are in some sense vulnerable who are making a claim for damages.3 
We can find support for the idea that a plaintiff’s vulnerability is or may be a relevant concern in decisions 
on the imposition on defendants of a duty of care in negligence, in decisions governing the imposition 
on defendants of vicarious liability in respect of the deliberate or negligent actions of another person, 
and in decisions recognising that defendants may be under a duty which cannot be delegated to other 
persons.4 The aim of this paper is to examine these three ways in which the common law courts have 
given expression to, and support for, the concept of plaintiff vulnerability, and, further, to consider any 
links and overlaps between them.5 The primary focus is on the decisions of the courts in the United 
Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, although cases from other jurisdictions are mentioned 
as well. 
These introductory words have not addressed the question as to when, exactly, a litigant may be 
regarded as vulnerable. It would hardly be possible to compile an exhaustive list of qualifying 
circumstances or conditions, and the underlying concept is clear. Speaking broadly, our concern is with 
a plaintiff’s relationship or connection with a defendant where, by reason of the plaintiff’s weakness 
and/or the defendant’s strength or power, the plaintiff typically is at a disadvantage in relation to the 
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1 Not everyone will agree. Rights theorists reject the relevance of policy concerns, such as, in particular, a wish 
to protect the vulnerable, in determining the ambit of rules of liability in tort. See especially R Stevens, Torts and 
Rights (OUP, Oxford, 2007); A Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2007), esp 
at 194-195. There are significant objections to a rights analysis of tort law, which will not be developed here. 
2 A modern instance of special legislative attention is the protection afforded in many countries to “consumers” 
in their dealings with commercial entities. Notable recent examples are the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 
in Australia and the Consumer Rights Act 2015 in the UK. 
3 Of course, vulnerable defendants are protected by the common law or equity in various ways. For example, 
the plea of non est factum was originally developed to protect those who were illiterate or blind, and the notion 
of vulnerability remains relevant in determining the question today. Again, the principles of equity protecting 
vulnerable persons from liability by reason of another person’s undue influence or unconscionable behaviour 
are long established. 
4 This means that the defendant cannot delegate legal responsibility in respect of performance of the duty, not 
that the defendant cannot delegate actual performance of the task in question. 
5 For an earlier examination on the theme of vulnerability, see J Stapleton, “The Golden Thread at the Heart of 
Tort Law: Protection of the Vulnerable” (2003) 24 Aus Bar Rev 135. 
  
other, or is open to mistreatment or exploitation, or is reliant on the other for protection.6 One can point 
to common instances – children under the control of adults, prisoners supervised by custodians, 
religious figureheads having influence over their flock. But, as will be seen, the question ultimately will 
be determined on the particular facts of a case. The decisions that are examined in the paper will help 
illuminate what “vulnerability” may encompass. 
Alleging personal liability for negligence 
Duty formulae 
The threshold condition for the imposition of liability in any negligence action is that the defendant must 
have owed a legal duty to the plaintiff to take care. The duty requirement exists in order to give some 
structure to the law of negligence, to assist in making the application of the law reasonably predictable 
and to confine the ambit of liability within reasonably acceptable boundaries. But quite how the question 
ought to be articulated and these desirable objectives achieved of course has preoccupied the courts 
on countless occasions. An orthodox explanation, founded on the judgments of Lord Atkin in Donoghue 
v Stevenson7  and of Lord Bridge in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman,8 goes something like this. A 
multitude of cases has determined whether there is a duty in a great variety of differing circumstances. 
In making their decisions the courts look to the accumulated experience of past courts in weighing the 
circumstances before them. This tends to mean that the existence or ambit of a duty in any particular 
case is usually well established and is not a live issue. However, in novel or borderline cases the courts 
have found it helpful to divide the inquiry into stages. So they ask whether the defendant should 
reasonably have foreseen the harm to the class of plaintiffs in question, whether that harm was suffered 
by the plaintiff’s “neighbour”, in the sense of a person who is closely and proximately affected by the 
defendant’s conduct, and whether it is fair, just and reasonable that a duty be recognised in all the 
circumstances of the case. Alternatively, taking an approach based on the judgment of Lord Wilberforce 
in Anns v Merton London Borough Council,9 they may make, first, an “internal” inquiry into everything 
bearing upon the relationship between the parties, and, second, an “external” inquiry into policy factors 
outside that relationship.10 
These staged approaches provide us with structures for determining contested duty issues, but whether 
the stages in truth involve discrete criteria is a matter of dispute. Lord Oliver in Caparo found it difficult 
to resist the conclusion that what had been treated as separate requirements were in most cases merely 
facets of the same thing. His Lordship pointed out that in some cases the degree of foreseeability was 
such that it was from that alone the requisite proximity could be deduced, whilst in others the absence 
of the essential relationship could most rationally be attributed simply to the court’s view that it would 
                                                          
6 For discussion about “consumers” (with possible application of relevant concepts in the present context), see 
Consumer Affairs Victoria Discussion Paper “What do we Mean by ‘Vulnerable’ and ‘Disadvantaged’ 
Consumers?” (2004); P Cartwright, “Understanding and Protecting Vulnerable Financial Consumers” (2015) 38 
Journal of Consumer Policy 119. 
7 [1932] AC 562 (HL). 
8 [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL). 
9 [1978] AC 728 (HL), at 751-752 
10 Both the Supreme Court of Canada and the Supreme Court of New Zealand have favoured the latter, two 
stage, inquiry: see, in particular, Cooper v Hobart 2001 SCC 79, [2001] 3 SCR 537; North Shore City Council v 
Attorney-General [2012] NZSC 49, [2012] 3 NZLR 341.  Singapore also takes a two-stage approach: see Spandeck 
Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v Defence Science & Technology Agency [2007] SGCA 37, [2007] 4 SLR 100. By contrast, 
in Hong Kong and in Ireland the Caparo formula is used: Luen Hing Fat Coating & Finishing Factory v Waan Chuen 
Ming [2011] 1 HKEC 97 (HKCA); Glencar Exploration plc v Mayo County Council (No 2) [2002] 1 IR 84 (IESC) at 
139. The High Court of Australia has preferred an unstructured assessment of the “salient features” of a 
particular case, with the inquiry being based ultimately on Donoghue v Stevenson: see Sullivan v Moody [2001] 
HCA 59, (2001) 207 CLR 562; Tame v New South Wales; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 35, 
(2002) 211 CLR 317; Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan [2002] HCA 54, (2002) 211 CLR 540.    
  
not be fair and reasonable to hold the defendant responsible.11 Further, in Michael v Chief Constable 
of South Wales Police12 Lord Toulson noted that, paradoxically, Lord Bridge’s words had sometimes 
come to be treated as a blueprint for deciding cases, despite the pains which the author took to make 
clear that it was not intended to be any such thing.  
Now it is true that there is no special magic in the formulation of these tests, and it is also true that the 
criteria may overlap or merge. The foreseeability of damage to the plaintiff or a class of plaintiffs  and 
the degree of proximity or neighbourhood between the parties are closely related issues. Again, the 
proximity question is bound up with the inquiry as to what is fair, just and reasonable in the 
circumstances of the case, for they both fulfil a controlling function and limit the potential ambit of a 
defendant’s liability. Even so, the focus of each of the criteria is different. The question whether harm is 
foreseeable is conceptually distinct from the proximity question, although both are internal in the sense 
that they are concerned with the nature and the closeness of the connection between the parties. Again, 
determining what is fair, just and reasonable and the inquiry into external factors outside the parties’ 
relationship both look to the effect on non-parties and on the structure of the law and on society 
generally, and very arguably it is helpful to separate out this aspect of the duty issue.  
Influential policies 
Of course, there is a more fundamental question arising out of the Caparo or Anns or any other test. 
Whatever formula is adopted, it cannot in itself direct us towards any particular conclusion. Rather, the 
actual decision must depend upon a value judgment of the court concerned, based upon its assessment 
of all the circumstances that it considers relevant to its inquiry. So, returning to Caparo once more, Lord 
Oliver said that to search for any single formula which would serve as a general test of liability was to 
pursue a will-o’-the-wisp. He thought that the attempt to state some general principle which would 
determine liability in an infinite variety of circumstances served not to clarify the law but merely to bedevil 
its development in a way which corresponded with practicality and common sense. Yet while the view 
that there can be no general, all-embracing, test is hardly contestable, it does not mean that nothing in 
the way of substantive guidance is possible. The question we need to consider is whether we can move 
beyond mere structure or formulae that can help organise our thinking13 and identify matters of 
substance that can provide us with some direction as to what we should be thinking about.  
The duty question may be argued in an almost unlimited range of circumstances, and all kinds of 
considerations may be taken into account, but it by no means follows that if the question has not been 
determined it is entirely at large or that every new decision is simply an ad hoc determination of policy. 
A court’s initial focus is likely to be on any possible analogies with existing case law, and the substantive 
policies underlying such case law equally will influence any incremental development that the court may 
be minded to favour. This in turn raises the question whether or to what extent we can distil some 
influential policies from existing cases, irrespective of the existence or the range of authority concerning 
the particular issue before a court. An exhaustive list of all potentially influential factors would be 
impossible to compile, even assuming it would be desirable to do so,14 yet underlying a great many of 
the courts’ decisions we can identify certain core conceptions of policy that can provide assistance in 
determining how to resolve many disputed duty issues.15 They include, inter alia, respect for the 
autonomy and freedom of action of the individual in deciding whether there is a duty to help or to prevent 
                                                          
11 [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL) , at 633. 
12 [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] 2 WLR 343 (SC), at [106]. 
13 South Pacific Manufacturing Co Ltd v New Zealand Security Consultants & Investigations Ltd [1992] 2 NZLR 282 
(CA) per Cooke P at 294. 
14 However, see the list of factors compiled by Allsop J in Caltex Refineries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Stavar (2009) 75 NSWLR 
649 at [103]. See also J Stapleton, “Duty of Care Factors: A Selection from the Judicial Menu” in P Cane and J 
Stapleton (eds) The Law of Obligations: Essays in Celebration of John Fleming (OUP 1998), 61. 
15 This thesis is developed in S Todd “A methodology of duty” in P Cane (ed) Centenary Essays for the High Court 
of Australia (Butterworths, Sydney, 2004) 221. They are at least core themes: see Houghton v Saunders [2014] 
NZHC 2229, [2015] 2 NZLR 74 at [673]–[678]. 
  
harm to another;16 a desire not to impose on defendants an indeterminate burden of liability;17 a need 
for any new duty to operate coherently and consistently with other existing rules governing the dispute 
before the court;18 and, our present concern, a wish to protect persons who are perceived to be 
vulnerable and deserving of special consideration. 
Duty principles and vulnerable victims 
A policy that brings into account a victim’s vulnerability has both a positive and a negative aspect. On 
the one hand, the concern is with protecting persons in a vulnerable position, who have no reasonably 
available means of protecting themselves. The notion of a plaintiff’s special vulnerability and need for 
                                                          
16 This basic principle can be fleshed out by reference to the political, moral and economic considerations 
identified by Lord Hoffmann in Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923 (HL), at 944. In political terms it was less of an 
invasion of an individual’s freedom for the law to require him to consider the safety of others in his actions than 
to impose upon him a duty to rescue or protect. A moral version of this point might be called the “why pick on 
me?” argument. A duty to prevent harm to others or to render assistance to a person in danger or distress might 
apply to a large and indeterminate class of people who happened to be able to do something. Why should one 
be liable rather than another? Further, in economic terms, the efficient allocation of resources usually required 
an activity should bear its own costs. If it benefited from being able to impose some of its costs on other people, 
the market was distorted because the activity appeared cheaper than it really was. So there needed to be some 
special reason why there should be a duty to act, which might be found where a person had undertaken to do 
so, or had induced reliance on him doing so, or had taken on the responsibilities of the owner or occupier of 
property. Again, in Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2009] 1 AC 874 (HL), at [23], Lord Hope, giving an overview, 
recognised that a duty to intervene might exist where a defender (i) had created a source of danger, or (ii) had 
exercised control over another, or (iii) had assumed a responsibility to or induced reliance by the pursuer. See 
also Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] 2 WLR 343 (SC), at [97]-[101] per 
Lord Toulson; J Goudkamp, “A Revolution in Duty of Care” (2015) 131 LQR 519. 
17 In New Zealand, in South Pacific Manufacturing Co Ltd v New Zealand Security Consultants & Investigations 
Ltd [1992] 2 NZLR 282 (CA), at 306, Richardson J referred to a balancing of the plaintiff’s moral claim to 
compensation for avoidable harm and the defendant’s moral claim to be protected from an undue burden of 
legal responsibility; and see North Shore City Council v Attorney-General [2012] NZSC 49, [2012] 3 NZLR 341, at 
[159]. In Australia, in Tame v New South Wales: Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 35, (2002) 211 
CLR 317, at [5], Gleeson CJ observed that the law is concerned not only with the compensation of injured 
plaintiffs but also with the imposition of liability upon defendants, and the effect of such liability upon the 
freedom and security with which people may conduct their ordinary affairs. Examples of the so-called floodgates 
factor are legion: see, in particular, Alcock v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310 (HL) 
(mental injury suffered by secondary victims); Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL), Hercules 
Managements Ltd v Ernst & Young [1997] 2 SCR 165 (SCC) (economic loss suffered by investors in negligently 
audited companies); Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd v Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd [1997] 3 SCR 1210 (SCC) 
(relational economic loss). 
18 This factor can be seen to arise in a number of contexts, although the argument certainly is likely to be 
contestable. For example: (i) the courts may seek to prevent the principles of negligence from improperly 
encroaching upon the province of contract (D & F Estates Ltd v Church Commissioners for England [1989] AC 177 
(HL); Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398 (HL)); (ii) recognition of a duty in negligence may tend 
to undermine other, more stringent, principles of tort liability (South Pacific Manufacturing Co Ltd v New Zealand 
Security Consultants & Investigations Ltd [1992] 2 NZLR 282 (CA) (negligence as compared to defamation, 
malicious prosecution) (but compare Spring v Guardian Assurance plc [1995] 2 AC 296 (HL); Young v Bella 2006 
SCC 3, [2006] 1 SCR 108); (iii) a negligence duty may be seen as operating inconsistently with the provisions of a 
statute (Sullivan v Moody [2001] HCA 59, (2001) 207 CLR 562, B v Attorney-General [2003] UKPC 61, [2003] 4 All 
ER 833, D v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust [2005] UKHL 23, [2005] 2 AC 373 (HL)) (no duty owed to 
suspected abusers of children where there was a potentially conflicting statutory obligation to protect the 
children); (iv) a negligence duty should not tend to undermine the proper relationship between judicial and 
executive power (Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728 (HL),, at 754, Cooper v Hobart [2001] 
SCC 79, [2001] 3 SCR 537). 
  
protection certainly has been singled out in decisions of the House of Lord,19 of the High Court of 
Australia20 and of the New Zealand Court of Appeal and Supreme Court.21 On the other hand, if people 
are well positioned to look after themselves a duty may be thought to be inappropriate. The court is 
concerned with the steps they could reasonably have taken to look after their own interests.22 This idea 
already underlies various defences to liability, notably that the plaintiff failed to take reasonable steps 
in mitigation of a loss, that he or she assumed the risk, or that he or she was guilty of contributory 
negligence, but it can also have a role to play in the duty inquiry.23 
If a person’s vulnerable position is a relevant concern for a court in making a duty inquiry, then clearly 
it is necessary to determine who is to be treated as vulnerable for this purpose. The principle cannot 
simply contemplate a plaintiff who is poor or ignorant or who otherwise might be thought to be in need 
of protection because of his or her individual circumstances. Any such principle would very likely be 
unworkable and impossible to administer.24 Indeed, and obviously, it would tend to discriminate against 
those who are rich or clever or resourceful. So the principle needs to operate in relation to certain kinds 
or categories of case which typically involve vulnerable plaintiffs. An example perhaps is found in the 
principle that one may be under a duty to act to prevent harm if one has induced a person to rely upon 
one doing so.25 In this kind of case the victim may be deprived of the chance of assistance by third 
parties or the opportunity to take steps by way of self-protection and may also be lulled into a false 
sense of security.26 And, fairly clearly, the idea of vulnerability is implicit in the principle. 
The assumption of responsibility for a person or for a task may induce reliance by another, yet the cases 
do not indicate that reliance is always necessary. In some limited circumstances, and quite apart from 
contract, assuming responsibility for another or for performing a task can engender a duty to persons 
                                                          
19 For example Smith v Eric S Bush [1990] 1 AC 831 (HL); White v Jones [1995] 2 AC 207 (HL); Stovin v Wise [1996] 
AC 923 (HL), at 940. 
20 For example Pyrenees Shire Council v Day [1998] HCA 3, (1998) 192 CLR 330; Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry 
Finance Committee [1999] HCA 59, (1999) 200 CLR 1; Perre v Apand Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 36, (1999) 198 CLR 180. 
21 For example, South Pacific Manufacturing Co Ltd v New Zealand Security Consultants & Investigations Ltd 
[1992] 2 NZLR 282 (CA), at 317–318; Rolls-Royce New Zealand Ltd v Carter Holt Harvey Ltd [2005] 1 NZLR 324 
(CA) at [61]–[62]; Couch v Attorney-General [2008] NZSC 45, [2008] 3 NZLR 725 at [71]; Carter Holt Harvey Ltd v 
Minister of Education [2016] NZSC 95 at [43]-[55]. 
22 For example, Leigh and Sillavan Ltd v Aliakmon Shipping Co Ltd [1986] AC 785 (HL) [The Aliakmon] at 818-819; 
James McNaughton Paper Group Ltd v Hicks Anderson & Co [1991] 2 QB 113 (CA); Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v 
Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241 at 284; Canadian National Railway Co v Norsk Pacific Steamship 
Co Ltd [1992] 1 SCR 1021 at 1052. 
23 J Stapleton, “Duty of Care and Economic Loss: A Wider Agenda” (1991) 107 LQR 249, at 265–266. 
24 The difficulty is exemplified by the debate in jurisdictions accepting that a third party purchaser may have an 
action against the builder in respect of the costs of putting right defects in a building. The High Court of Australia 
has held that “commercial” purchasers cannot sue as they are not vulnerable: Woolcock Street Investments Pty 
Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 16, (2004) 216 CLR 515; Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v Owners Corp Strata Plan 61288 
[2014] HCA 36, (2014) 88 ALJR 911. By contrast, one reason for the decision of the New Zealand Supreme Court 
in Body Corporate No 207624 v North Shore City Council [2012] NZSC 83, [2013] 2 NZLR 297 (Spencer on Byron), 
declining to draw a distinction between negligence claims involving residential and commercial owners of 
buildings was that the position as to vulnerability did not assist. Residential owners might be very well able to 
protect themselves and commercial owners might be highly vulnerable. However, it might be possible to draw 
a distinction between different types of building rather than between the circumstances of the owners of a 
building, which solution was adopted in Spencer on Byron in the Court of Appeal: North Shore City Council v Body 
Corporate 207624 [2011] NZCA 164, [2011] 2 NZLR 744. 
25 Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923 (HL), at 944. 
26 See, for example, Al-Kandari v JR Brown & Co [1988] QB 665 (CA); Hamilton-Jones v David & Snape (A Firm) 
[2003] EWHC 3147 (Ch), [2004] 1 WLR 924; Kent v Griffiths [2001] QB 36 (CA) at [14]; Vowles v Evans [2003] 
EWCA Civ 318, [2003] 1 WLR 1607; Fullowka v Pinkerton’s of Canada Ltd 2010 SCC 5, [2010] 1 SCR 132; Chandler 
v Cape plc [2012] EWCA Civ 525, [2012] 1 WLR 3111; compare Thompson v The Renwick Group Plc [2014] EWCA 
Civ 635, [2014] PIQR P18. 
  
who are sufficiently closely and proximately affected by a failure properly to carry it out. And, usually, 
that person is in a vulnerable position. As regards another person, a classic instance is the duty of a 
parent or person in loco parentis, like a school authority, to take care to safeguard a child from danger 
on the road, or from dangerous premises, or from being assaulted or abused.27 As regards the taking 
on of a task, an example is White v Jones.28 A testator instructed solicitors to draw up a new will giving 
a benefit to the plaintiffs, but died before the solicitors had acted on the instructions. The plaintiffs 
alleged that the solicitors were negligent in failing to carry out the instructions with due diligence. The 
House of Lords held that the solicitors were under a duty to take care, and one reason was that the 
solicitors, by accepting their instructions, had assumed responsibility for the task of procuring the 
execution of a skilfully drawn will knowing that the beneficiary was wholly dependent upon them 
carefully carrying out their function. The decision can be seen as creating a “pocket of liability”29 in 
circumstances where nobody else could protect the beneficiaries and they were the only persons likely 
to suffer loss if the will was negligently drawn. Other cases have declined to apply the White principle 
in arguably analogous circumstances where the plaintiff was not in a vulnerable position or dependent 
on the defendant or was reasonably able to take self-protective measures.30 
This brief sketch of the apparent influence of a vulnerability principle on the question whether a person 
is under a duty to take care no doubt deserves to be explained and developed in a good deal more 
detail. For present purposes, however, it serves as a suitable introduction to the theme of this paper. 
For just as the principle may sometimes bear upon the duty inquiry, it may also have an important role 
to play in relation to a person’s possible vicarious liability for another’s conduct or to whether a person 
may be held to be held to be under a non-delegable duty to take care in respect of a task that has been 
delegated to another. In a number of recent – and major – decisions the courts have been extending 
and clarifying the circumstances in which these special forms of liability, both arising through someone 
else’s conduct, can be held to exist. As will be explained, they constitute particularly clear instances 
where the courts can be seen to be providing special protection to vulnerable or defenceless persons. 
Indeed, they provide a very suitable setting for the courts in undertaking their task of developing the 
relevant principles.31 
We will look first at the recent decisions extending the ambit of vicarious liability, and then turn to the 
developments in relation to the imposition of a non-delegable duty of care. As will be seen, protecting 
the vulnerable is an underlying theme under both heads, as an intended consequence of the widening 
of the relevant principles of liability under the first head and directly under the second. 
                                                          
27 Parents: McCallion v Dodd [1966] NZLR 710 (CA); Tweed Shire Council v Howarth [2009] NSWCA 103, (2009) 
Aust Torts Reports 82-101. Local authority: Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 550 (HL). 
Schools: Barnes v Hants County Council [1969] 1 WLR 1563 (HL); Hahn v Conley (1971) 126 CLR 276; Geyer v 
Downs (1977) 138 CLR 91; The Commonwealth of Australia v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258; Myers v Peel County 
Board of Education [1981] 2 SCR 21.  
28 [1995] 2 AC 207 (HL); and see Gorham v British Telecommunications plc [2000] 1 WLR 2129 (CA). 
29 J Stapleton, “Comparative Economic Loss: Lessons From Case-Law-Focused ‘Middle Theory’” (2002) 50 UCLA 
L Rev 531, 531. 
30 For example, Brownie Wills v Shrimpton [1998] 2 NZLR 320 (CA) (no duty owed by solicitors to a director who 
had guaranteed a loan to the director’s company where the solicitors, in breach of the lender’s instructions, had 
negligently failed to explain to the director the nature of the guarantee); and see Wells v First National 
Commercial Bank [1998] PNLR 14 (CA); Briscoe v Lubrizol Ltd [2000] ICR 694 (CA); but compare Kapfunde v Abbey 
National plc [1999] ICR 1 (CA). 
31 Sometimes both forms of liability may be found to arise out of the one set of facts. In Maga v Archbishop of 
Birmingham [2010] EWCA Civ 256, [2010] 1 WLR 1441 a priest in charge of a presbytery owed a duty to take 
care to protect a vulnerable boy from sexual abuse committed by one of the priests living at the presbytery, and 
the defendant archdiocese was vicariously liable in respect of both wrongdoers. And see A v Trustees of the 
Watchtower Bible and Tract Society [2015] EWHC 1722 (QB) at [92]–[122] (failure by elders of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses to protect child from abuse when they knew of wrongdoer’s earlier abuse of another child). 
  
Alleging vicarious liability 
In Various Claimants v The Catholic Child Welfare Society32 (the Christian Brothers case) Lord Phillips 
said that the law of vicarious liability was on the move. In Cox v Ministry of Justice33  (Cox) Lord Reed 
observed it had not yet come to a stop and that the instant appeal, and the accompanying decision of 
the Supreme Court in Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets plc34 (Mohamud) provided an 
opportunity to take stock of where it had got to so far. In the discussion that follows we will be looking 
closely at these three decisions. We also will be examining Prince Alfred College Inc v ADC35 (Prince 
Alfred), where the High Court of Australia recognised that its earlier decision in New South Wales v 
Lepore36 had failed to provide a majority view concerning the question of vicarious liability in the case 
of an intentional tort, and that it was time for the Court to revisit this question. 
Policy 
If the law on vicarious liability is moving (and it clearly is), we need to consider first the underlying 
policies that the courts are seeking to achieve. Yet pinning these policies down with precision is not an 
easy task. In a leading decision in New Zealand Tipping J remarked that the literature was replete with 
comments concerning the lack of any coherent or agreed jurisprudential underpinning.37 Indeed, the 
courts have tended to assert that the policy basis of vicarious liability lies in a combination of loss-
spreading, deterring  behaviour likely to cause harm and, broadly, the justice of the case at hand rather 
than the result of any clearly developed and logical legal principle.38  The recent decisions in the United 
Kingdom all tend to illustrate this proposition.  
In the Christian Brothers case,39 Lord Phillips said that the policy objective underlying vicarious liability 
was to ensure, insofar as it was fair, just and reasonable, that liability for tortious wrong was borne by 
a defendant with the means to compensate the victim. Such defendants could usually be expected to 
insure against the risk of such liability, so that this risk was more widely spread. It was for the court to 
identify the policy reasons why it was fair, just and reasonable to impose vicarious liability and to lay 
down the criteria that had to be shown to be satisfied in order to establish vicarious liability. Where the 
criteria were satisfied the policy reasons for imposing the liability should apply. His Lordship considered 
that there was no difficulty in identifying a number of policy reasons that usually made it fair, just and 
reasonable to impose vicarious liability on an employer where an employee committed a tort in the 
course of his employment. They were:  (i) the employer was more likely to have the means to 
compensate the victim than the employee and could be expected to have insured against that liability; 
(ii) the tort would have been committed as a result of activity being taken by the employee on behalf of 
the employer; (iii) the employee's activity was likely to be part of the business activity of the employer; 
(iv) the employer, by employing the employee to carry on the activity would have created the risk of the 
tort committed by the employee; (v) The employee would, to a greater or lesser degree, have been 
under the control of the employer. Importantly, his Lordship subsequently added that where the 
defendant and the tortfeasor were not bound by a contract of employment, but their relationship had 
                                                          
32 [2012] UKSC 56, [2013] 2 AC 1, at [19]; P Morgan, “Vicarious Liability on the Move” (2013) 129 LQR 139; Rt 
Hon Lord Hope of Craighead, “Tailoring the Law on Vicarious Liability” (2013) 129 LQR 514; J Bell, “The Basis of 
Vicarious Liability” (2013) 72 CLJ 17. 
33 [2016] UKSC 10, [2016] 2 WLR 806, at [1]. 
34 [2016] UKSC 11, [2016] 2 WLR 821. 
35 [2016] HCA 37. 
36 [2003] HCA 4, (2003) 212 CLR 511; see below n 72 and accompanying text. 
37 S v Attorney-General [2003] 3 NZLR 450 (CA) at [107]. 
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the same incidents, that relationship could properly give rise to vicarious liability on the ground that it 
was “akin to that between an employer and an employee”. 
In Cox Lord Reed discussed and commented on these views.40 He maintained that the five factors 
which Lord Phillips mentioned were not all equally significant. The first - the defendant’s means and the 
likelihood he was insured - did not feature in the remainder of the judgment and was unlikely to be of 
independent significance in most cases, for neither was a principled justification.41 The mere possession 
of wealth was not in itself any ground for imposing liability. As for insurance, employers insured 
themselves because they were liable: they were not liable because they had insured themselves. The 
significance of the fifth of the factors – the employer’s control over the tortfeasor - was that the defendant 
could direct what the tortfeasor did, not how he did it. So understood, it was a factor which was unlikely 
to be of independent significance in most cases. On the other hand, the absence of even that vestigial 
degree of control would be liable to negative the imposition of vicarious liability. 
Lord Reed said that the remaining factors – (1) activity by the tortfeasor on behalf of the defendant, (2) 
which was likely to be part of the business activity of the defendant,  (3) which would have created the 
risk of the tort being committed – were inter-related. The first had been reflected historically in 
explanations of the vicarious liability of employers based on deemed authorisation or delegation. The 
second contemplated that, since the employee's activities were undertaken as part of the activities of 
the employer and for its benefit, it was appropriate that the employer should bear the cost of harm 
wrongfully done by the employee within the field of activities assigned to him. The third factor was very 
closely related to the second: since the risk of an individual behaving negligently, or indeed committing 
an intentional wrong, was a fact of life, anyone who employed others to carry out activities was likely to 
create the risk of their behaving tortiously within the field of activities assigned to them. The essential 
idea was that the defendant should be liable for torts that might fairly be regarded as risks of his 
business activities, whether they were committed for the purpose of furthering those activities or not. 
Christian Brothers wove together these related ideas so as to develop a modern theory of vicarious 
liability.  
It is apparent from this brief account that the core policy favouring the imposition of vicarious liability 
and identified in Christian Brothers and Cox is founded on the defendant’s business or activity having 
created the risk of the harm, rendering it just that the defendant should pay for it. We will be considering 
in more detail quite what is contemplated by this notion of risk and, in particular, how it protects 
vulnerable people.  Furthermore, and crucially, that policy can be seen as driving the expansion in the 
reach of vicarious liability that was achieved in Christian Brothers and applied in Cox. It also tends to 
promote a coming together or fusion of the orthodox requirements for the imposition of vicarious liability, 
viz, establishing (i) the kind of relationship between the defendant and the wrongdoer and (ii) the kind 
of link between that relationship and the conduct of the wrongdoer, which are necessary to found such 
liability. 
How, then, did Christian Brothers move the law forward? It did so in three critical respects.42 First, the 
orthodox relationship founding vicarious liability is, of course, that between an employer and an 
employee, and Christian Brothers extended the law by including relationships “analogous to 
employment”. Second, leading authority in the UK took the view that only one defendant could be 
vicariously liable for a tortious act, but Christian Brothers accepted and applied the concept of dual 
vicarious liability. Third, the earlier decision of the House of Lords in Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd43 had 
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supported replacing, at least for some cases, the “course of employment” test used in establishing the 
requisite link between the employment and the tortious conduct with a test asking whether there was a 
“close connection” between the relationship and the wrong, and Christian Brothers affirmed the use of 
that test. We will deal with all three developments and will give special attention to the third.  
Relationships analogous to employment 
The core of the doctrine of vicarious liability traditionally has involved commercial employers being held 
liable for negligence by their employees that is committed in the course of employment. But the new 
developments have been driven by cases involving child abuse committed by priests in circumstances 
where the defendant being sued was not their employer and, significantly, where the plaintiff was 
vulnerable to suffering that abuse. In John Doe v Bennett44 a Roman Catholic priest had sexually 
assaulted boys in his parishes, and the question was whether the diocesan episcopal corporation sole, 
which was equated with the bishop, was vicariously liable. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the 
relationship between a bishop and a priest in a diocese was “akin to an employment relationship”, and 
also that the necessary connection between the employer-created or enhanced risk and the wrong was 
established. E v English Province of Our Lady of Charity45 is a similar decision of the Court of Appeal 
in England. Ward LJ expressed the test to be whether the tortfeasor bore a sufficiently close 
resemblance and affinity in character to a true employee that justice and fairness to both victim and 
defendant required the court to extend vicarious liability to cover the tortfeasor’s wrongdoing. On the 
facts this test was satisfied. The tortfeasor was a priest for the parish in which the children’s home 
where the plaintiff lived was situated. He was accountable to the bishop, was subject to the bishop’s 
sanction, including removal from the parish, and was fully integrated into the organisation of the church, 
pursuing its fundamental aims and objectives on its behalf. 
By this decision the Court of Appeal took the first step in creating a new, overarching, category of 
vicarious liability. Indeed, the logical next step might be to focus on the substantive characteristics of a 
relationship which justifies and attracts vicarious liability, excising the need to ask whether there is a 
contract of employment or something akin to it.46 In The Christian Brothers case,47 decided shortly 
afterwards, the Supreme Court did not follow this route, but it did confirm and develop the thinking in E 
v English Province. The question here was whether the Institute of the Brothers of the Christian Schools 
(the Institute), founded by Jean-Baptiste De La Salle in 1680, was responsible for sexual and physical 
abuse of children committed by its brothers at a residential institute for boys (St William’s) who were in 
need of care and protection. Claims had been brought by the victims against two groups of defendants. 
The first (called the Middlesbrough Defendants), who were the managers of the school and the 
employers of the brother teachers, were held at first instance to be vicariously liable in respect of abuse 
by those teachers. The second (the Institute Defendants) were found not to be vicariously liable, on the 
basis that the Institute did not employ the brothers at St William’s. Rather, it sent its brothers to teach 
there. The Court of Appeal upheld the judge’s decision,48 and the Middlesbrough Defendants appealed, 
on the ground that the Institute should share joint vicarious liability for the acts of its brother members. 
The Supreme Court was unanimous in upholding this contention. 
Lord Phillips (with whom Lady Hale, Lord Kerr, Lord Wilson and Lord Carnworth agreed) explained first 
how the Institute operated.49 Its members were bound by lifelong vows of poverty, chastity and 
obedience and lived a communal life together as brothers, following a strict code of conduct. The 
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Institute’s mission was to provide a Christian education to boys, and in pursuance of that activity it 
owned and managed schools in which its members taught, and it sent its members to teach at schools 
managed by other bodies (as was the case with St William’s). The brothers renounced any salaries 
payable for their teaching, which were instead paid to charitable trusts for the benefit of the Institute and 
used to meet the needs of the brothers and the financial requirements of the teaching mission. The 
Institute itself was not itself a corporate body, but the trusts through which it operated had recognised 
legal personality, and in the circumstances Lord Phillips saw it as appropriate to approach the case as 
if the Institute were incorporated, able to own property and possessing substantial assets. 
On these findings his Lordship was satisfied that the relationship between the defendant and the 
tortfeasor had the same incidents as that of a contract of employment and could properly give rise to 
vicarious liability, on the ground that it was “akin to that between an employer and an employee”.50 That 
was the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in E v English Province. And in the instant case the 
relationship between the teaching brothers and the Institute had all the essential elements of the 
relationship between employer and employee: the Institute was subdivided into a hierarchical structure 
and conducted its activities as if it were a corporate body; the teaching activity of the brothers was 
undertaken because the provincial head directed the brothers to undertake it; the teaching activity 
undertaken by the brothers also was in furtherance of the objective, or mission, of the Institute; and the 
manner in which the brother teachers were obliged to conduct themselves as teachers was dictated by 
the Institute’s rules. The relationship between the teacher brothers and the Institute differed from that 
of the relationship between employer and employee in that the brothers were bound to the Institute not 
by contract, but by their vows, and the brothers entered into deeds under which they were obliged to 
transfer all their earnings to the Institute, but neither difference was material. Indeed, they rendered the 
relationship closer than that of an employer and its employees.51 
Let us turn now to Cox.52 The question in this case was whether the UK Ministry of Justice could be 
held vicariously liable for the negligence of a prisoner assisting with work in the prison kitchen who 
dropped a heavy bag of rice onto the prison catering manager and injured her. Here, then, the 
wrongdoer was not an employee of the prison authority. Lord Reed affirmed that the general approach 
in Christian Brothers was not confined to some special category of cases, such as the sexual abuse of 
children.53 By focusing upon the business activities carried on by the defendant and their attendant 
risks, it directed attention to the issues which were likely to be relevant in the context of modern 
workplaces, where workers might in reality be part of the workforce of an organisation without having a 
contract of employment with it, and also reflected prevailing ideas about the responsibility of businesses 
for the risks which were created by their activities. It extended the scope of vicarious liability, but not to 
the extent of imposing such liability where a tortfeasor's activities were entirely attributable to the 
conduct of a recognisably independent business of his own or of a third party. That extension enabled 
the law to maintain previous levels of protection for the victims of torts, notwithstanding changes in the 
legal relationships between enterprises and members of their workforces which might be motivated by 
factors which had nothing to do with the nature of the enterprises' activities or the attendant risks. 
Lord Reed said also that it not necessary that the defendant be carrying on activities of a commercial 
nature:. it was sufficient that the defendant be carrying on activities in the furtherance of its own 
interests.54 The individual for whose conduct it might be vicariously liable must carry on activities 
assigned to him by the defendant as an integral part of its operation and for its benefit. The defendant 
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must, by assigning those activities to him, have created a risk of his committing the tort. A wide range 
of circumstances could satisfy those requirements. 
Applying this approach, Lord Reed was satisfied that the requirements laid down in the Christian 
Brothers case were met and that the Ministry was vicariously liable.55 The prison service carried on 
activities in furtherance of its aims. The fact that those aims were not commercially motivated, but 
served the public interest, was no bar to the imposition of vicarious liability. Prisoners working in the 
prison kitchens were integrated into the operation of the prison, so that the activities assigned to them 
by the prison service formed an integral part of the activities which it carried on in the furtherance of its 
aims: in particular, the activity of providing meals for prisoners. They worked under the direction of 
prison staff in a position where there was a risk that they might commit a variety of negligent acts within 
the field of activities assigned to them. The activities assigned to them were not merely of benefit to 
themselves. Their activities formed part of the operation of the prison, and were of direct and immediate 
benefit to the prison service itself. 
For present purposes it is sufficient to emphasise two things. First, Cox has affirmed that the question 
whether the relationship between the defendant and the wrongdoer is analogous to that between an 
employer and an employee may be asked in any case: it is not confined to sexual abuse or similar 
cases. But second, a court is likely to find such a relationship in many or most cases where the 
defendant has been instrumental in placing the tortfeasor in a position where he or she is able to 
exercise significant power or influence over the victim. In the very nature of things the defendant will 
necessarily have had influence and control in respect of the wrongdoer having acquired that position of 
power vis-a-vis the victim. And as will be explained, a position involving such power is a key factor in 
finding a close connection between the defendant’s relationship with the wrongdoer and the tortious 
conduct involved. The “analogous to employment” test thus is particularly well suited for giving a remedy 
for those who are especially vulnerable to the wrongdoer’s misuse of his or her position. 
Dual vicarious liability 
A key issue in the Christian Brothers case that the Supreme Court needed to consider before it could 
determine the claim against the De La Salle Institute was whether dual vicarious liability could be 
imposed on both the Middlesbrough Defendants and the Institute. The background to this inquiry lay in 
early cases concerning borrowed servants, notably Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v Coggins & 
Griffith (Liverpool) Ltd,56 which proceeded on the basis that only one employer could be vicariously 
liable for a tortious act and that which it was turned on who had the ultimate power and control over the 
employee concerned. But two decisions in 2005 - Viasystems (Tyneside) Ltd v Thermal Transfer 
(Northern) Ltd57 in England and Blackwater v Plint58 in Canada – accepted that it was possible in law to 
have dual vicarious liability. In Viasystems May LJ, applying Mersey Docks, held that the inquiry should 
concentrate on the relevant negligent act and then ask whose responsibility it was to prevent it. “Who 
was entitled, and perhaps theoretically obliged, to give orders as to how the work should or should not 
be done?”59 Entire or absolute control was not a necessary precondition, and dual control and thus dual 
vicarious liability was possible. Rix LJ took a rather different approach.60 He noted that the courts had 
imperceptibly moved from using the test of control as determinative of the relationship of employer and 
employee to using it as the test of vicarious liability of a defendant, and questioned whether vicarious 
liability was to be equated with control. Rather, what one was looking for was a situation where the 
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employee in question was so much part of the work, business or organisation of both employers that it 
was just to make both employers answer for his negligence. 
In Christian Brothers, Lord Phillips approved the decision in Viasystems and applied it to the facts of 
the case.61 He noted that the brothers who taught at St William’s were not contractually employed by 
the Institute; rather, they were employed by or on behalf of the Middlesbrough Defendants. But dual 
liability could be imposed. Where two defendants were potentially vicariously liable for the act of a 
tortfeasor it was necessary to give independent consideration to the relationship of the tortfeasor with 
each defendant in order to decide whether that defendant was vicariously liable. And in considering that 
question in relation to each defendant, the approach of Rix LJ was to be preferred to that of May LJ. 
In Cox, Lord Reed observed that a lesson to be drawn from these recent cases was that defendants 
could not avoid vicarious liability on the basis of technical arguments about the employment status of 
the individual who committed the tort. What weighed with the courts in E v English Province and 
Christian Brothers was that the abusers were placed by the organisations in question, as part of their 
mission, in a position in which they committed a tort whose commission was a risk inherent in the 
activities assigned to them.62 So the approach taken to cases of dual vicarious liability reinforces the 
argument already advanced, that finding a relationship between the parties that can support the 
imposition of vicarious liability and finding a close connection between that relationship and the 
wrongdoing, are intimately related inquiries, and both tend to operate to protect those who are 
particularly vulnerable to suffering harm at the hands of the wrongdoer. 
The close connection test 
The classic approach to the question whether there is a sufficient link between an employer and the tort 
of his or her employee so as to make the employer vicariously liable is elaborated in the first edition of 
Salmond on Torts and has become known as the “Salmond test”.63 It must be asked whether the 
wrongful act was committed “in the course” or “within the scope” of employment,64 with the relevant act 
being “either (a) a wrongful act authorised by the master, or (b) a wrongful and unauthorised mode of 
doing some act authorised by the master”. The second limb is amplified by the proposition that a master 
is liable for acts which he has not authorised if they are “so connected with acts which he has authorised, 
that they may rightly be regarded as modes - although improper modes - of doing them”.  
The first limb of this test may provide a means of establishing vicarious liability for agents who are not 
employees, or constitute a form of accessory liability. The second limb raises the problem of deciding 
whether conduct is an unauthorised mode of doing something or simply is not authorised at all. While 
the test is reasonably workable where an employee is alleged to have been negligent during his or her 
employment, there is obvious difficulty in finding that it can be satisfied in cases where an employee 
has engaged in deliberate wrongdoing for his or her own benefit. Indeed, it would be impossible to 
satisfy in the context of claims alleging sexual abuse by employees or persons in analogous positions: 
such conduct must be the very antithesis of what the person concerned would be expected to do. Unless 
all such claims are to fail a different approach needs to be taken. 
The judgment of McLachlin J in the Supreme Court of Canada in Bazley v Curry65 introduced a different 
and a more satisfactory approach. Her Honour maintained that vicarious liability was generally 
appropriate where there was a significant connection between the creation or enhancement of a risk 
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and the wrongful act, even if unrelated to the employer’s desires. Relevant factors might include the 
opportunity that the enterprise afforded the employee to abuse his or her power; the extent to which the 
wrongful act may have furthered the employer’s aims (and hence be more likely to have been committed 
by the employee); the extent to which the wrongful act was related to friction, confrontation or intimacy 
inherent in the employer’s enterprise; the extent of power conferred on the employee in relation to the 
victim; and the vulnerability of potential victims to wrongful exercise of the employee’s power. 
Applying these principles to the particular facts, it was held that a foundation operating residential care 
facilities for troubled children was vicariously liable for paedophilic assaults by a care-giving employee. 
There was a strong connection between the role that the employee was required to carry out and the 
opportunities to commit the wrongful acts. The employee’s duties included general supervision and also 
intimate activities like bathing and putting the children to bed, and in these circumstances the employer 
was seen as having created or enhanced the risk of his sexual wrongdoing. By contrast, in Jacobi v 
Griffiths,66 another decision of the Supreme Court delivered on the same day as Bazley, it was held that 
a children’s club was not vicariously liable for sexual abuse by an employee away from the club 
premises and outside working hours. The employment gave the opportunity to commit the assaults, but 
the employee was not placed in a special position of trust with regard to “care, protection and nurturing”, 
and the actual work created no special risk of wrongdoing.67 A number of other decisions of the same 
court seek to draw this line.68 
In Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd,69 where the House of Lords considered Bazley for the first time, it was held 
unanimously that the owners and managers of a school, as employer, were vicariously liable for sexual 
abuse committed by one of their employees, who was the warden of a boarding house. Bazley was 
treated not as laying down some new principle but as a clarifying elaboration of the second limb to the 
Salmond test. Lord Steyn, whose judgment referred to Bazley and Jacobi as “luminous and 
illuminating”, noted that the “close connection” test was itself based on the Salmond test requiring that 
the relevant act be a mode — albeit an improper mode — of an authorised act. His Lordship thought 
that the appropriate question was whether the acts in question were “so closely connected with [the] 
employment that it would be fair and just to hold the employers vicariously liable”. The focus was on 
whether vicarious liability should result from the relative closeness of the misconduct to the nature of 
the employment, and in the instant case the sexual abuse was “inextricably interwoven” with the 
carrying out by the warden of his duties at the school. Lord Millett also referred with approval to the 
Canadian decisions and recognised that it was critical that attention be directed to the closeness of the 
connection between the employee’s duties and his wrongdoing. Experience showed that in the case of 
boarding schools, prisons, nursing homes, old people’s homes, geriatric wards, and other residential 
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homes for the young or vulnerable, there was an inherent risk that indecent assaults on the residents 
would be committed by those placed in authority over them, particularly if they were in close proximity 
to them and occupying a position of trust. 
All members of the Court in Lister agreed that the test of “close connection” should be applied, but only 
Lord Millett endorsed the importance that the Canadian decisions attached to the creation of risk. In 
Christian Brothers the Supreme Court took the further step and held that there needed to be proof that 
the defendant caused a material increase in the risk that abuse would occur. In Lord Phillips’s words:70 
Vicarious liability is imposed where a defendant, whose relationship with the abuser put it in a 
position to use the abuser to carry on its business or to further its own interests, has done so in 
a manner which has created or significantly enhanced the risk that the victim or victims would 
suffer the relevant abuse. The essential closeness of connection between the relationship 
between the defendant and the tortfeasor and the acts of abuse thus involves a strong causative 
link. 
These are the criteria that establish the necessary ‘close connection’ between relationship and 
abuse. I do not think that it is right to say that creation of risk is simply a policy consideration 
and not one of the criteria. Creation of risk is not enough, of itself, to give rise to vicarious liability 
for abuse but it is always likely to be an important element in the facts that give rise to such 
liability. 
In the instant case the close connection between the relationship between the brothers and the Institute 
and the abuse committed at the school was made out. The relationship between the Institute and the 
brothers enabled the Institute to place the brothers in teaching positions and, in particular, in the position 
of headmaster at St William’s. So there was a very close connection between the relationship between 
the brothers and the Institute and the employment of the brothers as teachers in the school. Living 
cloistered on the school premises were boys who were vulnerable because they were children in the 
school, because they were virtually prisoners, and because their personal histories made it very unlikely 
that if they attempted to disclose what was happening to them they would be believed. The brother 
teachers were placed in the school to care for the educational and religious needs of these pupils. 
Abusing the boys in their care was diametrically opposed to those objectives but, paradoxically, that 
very fact was one of the factors that provided the necessary close connection between the abuse and 
the relationship between the brothers and the Institute that gave rise to vicarious liability on the part of 
the latter. It was not a borderline case. It was one where it was fair, just and reasonable, by reason of 
the satisfaction of the relevant criteria, for the Institute to share with the Middlesbrough Defendants 
vicarious liability for the abuse committed by the brothers.71 
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The decision of the High Court of Australia in New South Wales v Lepore72 was out of step with these 
developments. In this case Gleeson CJ and Kirby J, relying on Bazley and Lister, were prepared to 
accept that an institution might be held vicariously liable for sexual abuse committed by a teacher. 
However, the other members of the court took different and contrasting views. Gaudron J considered 
that the only principled basis upon which vicarious liability could be imposed for deliberate criminal 
conduct was that the defendant was estopped from asserting that the person whose acts were in 
question was not acting as his or her servant, agent or representative when the acts occurred. Gummow 
and Hayne JJ, in a joint judgment, considered that recovery against the employer in the case of an 
intentional tort should be limited to where the conduct was done in the intended pursuit of the employer’s 
interests or the apparent execution of the authority which the employer held out the employee as having, 
and there was not the slightest semblance of proper authority to sexually assault a pupil.73 Callinan J 
thought that claims of abuse had to fail because deliberate criminal misconduct lay outside, and usually 
far outside, the scope or course of an employed teacher’s duty. However, an alternative analysis 
favoured by McHugh J was that sexual abuse by a teacher of a child amounted to a breach of a non-
delegable duty owed by the institution to the child. We will be returning to this last question. 
In Prince Alfred College Inc v ADC74 the High Court of Australia recognised that, as a result of the 
differing views expressed in Lepore, there was a need for some guidance to be provided to lower courts 
so as to reduce the risk of unnecessary appeals arising out of its uncertainties. French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, 
Keane and Nettle JJ, in a joint judgment,75 noted that recent decisions in Canada and the United 
Kingdom had developed tests for imposing vicarious liability which had regard to the connection 
between the wrongful act concerned and the employment and, in the United Kingdom, to what a judge 
determined to be fair and just. These new tests of connection were devised not only to provide an 
explanation for cases of the kind to which they were initially addressed – involving the sexual abuse of 
children in educational, residential or care facilities by employees having special positions with respect 
to the children – but also to serve as a basis for vicarious liability which might apply more generally. But 
general principle of that kind depended upon policy choices and the allocation of risk, which were 
matters upon which minds might differ.  An acceptable general basis for liability had eluded the common 
law of Australia, and it was well for the present to continue with the orthodox route of considering 
whether the approach taken in decided cases furnished a solution to further cases as they arose.  This 
had the advantage of consistency in what might, at some time in the future, develop into principle.  And 
it had the advantage of being likely to identify factors which pointed toward liability and by that means 
provided explanation and guidance for future litigation. 
On this approach, their Honours considered that the key was to be found in the words of Dixon J in 
Deatons Pty Ltd v Flew,76 that vicarious liability might arise where the employment provided the 
“occasion” for the wrongful act.77 The fact that a wrongful act was a criminal offence did not preclude 
the possibility of vicarious liability. It was possible for a criminal offence to be an act for which the 
apparent performance of employment provided the occasion.  Conversely, the fact that employment 
afforded an opportunity for the commission of the act was not of itself a sufficient reason to attract 
vicarious liability. Even so, the role given to the employee and the nature of the employee's 
responsibilities might justify the conclusion that the employment not only provided an opportunity but 
also was the occasion for the commission of the wrongful act.  By way of example, it might be sufficient 
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to hold an employer vicariously liable for a criminal act committed by an employee where, in the 
commission of that act, the employee used or took advantage of the position in which the employment 
placed the employee vis-à-vis the victim. 
Consequently, in cases of this kind, the court should consider any special role that the employer had 
assigned to the employee and the position in which the employee was thereby placed vis-à-vis the 
victim.  In determining whether the apparent performance of such a role might be said to give the 
"occasion" for the wrongful act, particular features might be taken into account.  They included authority, 
power, trust, control and the ability to achieve intimacy with the victim.  The latter feature might be 
especially important.  Where, in such circumstances, the employee took advantage of his or her position 
with respect to the victim, that might suffice to determine that the wrongful act should be regarded as 
committed in the course or scope of employment and as such render the employer vicariously liable. 
The instant case concerned a claim by a former pupil at the Prince Alfred College (PAC) in respect of 
the sexual abuse he suffered at the hands of a housemaster, one Bain, employed by PAC. The abuse 
had happened many years earlier, and after it came to light the claimant accepted a settlement of money 
offered by PAC. But after his psychiatric condition worsened and his financial situation became 
desperate he changed his mind and sought to have the limitation period for bringing an action extended. 
The High Court held that permission should not be granted, and also that no finding on liability could or 
should have been made due to deficiencies in the available evidence. The relevant approach required 
a careful examination of the role the PAC actually assigned to housemasters and the position in which 
Bain was placed vis-à-vis the claimant and the other children. Much of the evidence necessary to a 
determination had been lost, and the PAC would be prejudiced in various ways if it were required to 
defend an action at this late juncture. 
Whether the distinction drawn by the High Court between the employment providing the “occasion” for 
and the “opportunity” for the abuse is a real one is doubtful. The words can be, and are, used 
interchangeably. The idea of a close connection based upon the creation of a risk is preferable, for it is 
clear that the nature of the abuser’s job and the tasks he is given or authorised to carry out are pivotal 
in determining whether the test is satisfied. Yet the High Court certainly recognised that such 
employment-created risk was the focus of the inquiry, apparently seeing this as inherent in its favoured 
test. At all events the more substantial difference between the approach in Australia and the approach 
in the United Kingdom lies in the breadth of the application of the close connection test, and to this 
question we will now turn. 
A close connection in non-sexual abuse cases 
The discussion of the close connection test so far has concentrated on sexual abuse cases. In 
Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets plc78 the United Kingdom Supreme Court applied the test in a 
quite different situation. The claimant, who was of Somali origin, inquired at the defendant’s petrol 
station about printing documents from a USB stick, but the defendant’s employee, who worked in the 
kiosk, abused him using foul, racist and threatening language. The claimant then returned to his car but 
the employee followed him and subjected him to a violent assault, ignoring instructions to stop by the 
employee’s supervisor. The claimant sued the defendant employer seeking damages in respect of this 
unprovoked assault. The claim failed both at first instance and in the Court of Appeal,79 and the claimant 
appealed to the Supreme Court.80 
Lord Toulson, giving the leading judgment, recognised that Salmond’s formula had been cited and 
applied in many cases, sometimes by stretching it artificially; but even with stretching, it was not 
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universally satisfactory.81 The difficulties in its application were particularly evident in cases of injury to 
persons or property caused by an employee’s deliberate act of misconduct. One line of argument was 
to ask whether an employee had been charged with keeping order, so that an assault by the employee 
could be described as an improper mode of performing the work. But the cases were conflicting and 
not entirely satisfactory, and his Lordship thought that it was more helpful to ask whether conduct was 
“within the field of activities” assigned to the employee82 or to ask “what was the job on which [the 
employee] was engaged for his employer?”83 At all events he considered that in Lister the Salmond 
formula was stretched to breaking point, for even on its most elastic interpretation the sexual abuse of 
the children could not be described as a mode, albeit an improper mode, of caring for them. Lord Steyn 
had posed the broad question whether the warden’s torts was so closely connected with his 
employment that it would be just to hold the employers liable, and concluded that the employers were 
vicariously liable because they undertook the care of the children through the warden and he abused 
them. There was therefore a close connection between his employment and his tortious acts. To similar 
effect, Lord Clyde had said that the warden had a general duty to look after the children, and the fact 
that he abused them did not sever the connection with his employment; his acts had to be seen in the 
context that he was entrusted with responsibility for their care, and it was right that his employers should 
be liable for the way in which he behaved towards them as warden of the house. 
Lord Toulson observed that the court in Lister was mindful of the risk of over-concentration on a 
particular form of terminology, and thought there was a similar risk in attempting to over-refine, or lay 
down a list of criteria for determining, what precisely amounted to a sufficiently close connection to 
make it just for the employer to be held vicariously liable.84 Simplification of the essence was more 
desirable. Taking this approach, the court had to consider two matters. The first question, to be 
addressed broadly, was what functions or “field of activities” had been entrusted by the employer to the 
employee, or, in everyday language, what was the nature of his job. Secondly, the court had to decide 
whether there was sufficient connection between the position in which he was employed and his 
wrongful conduct to make it right for the employer to be held liable as a matter of social justice. The 
cases in which the necessary connection had been found were cases in which the employee used or 
misused the position entrusted to him in a way which injured the third party. 
In the instant case it was the employee’s job to attend to customers and to respond to their inquiries. 
His conduct in answering the claimant’s request in a foul mouthed way and ordering him to leave was 
inexcusable but within the “field of activities” assigned to him. What happened thereafter was an 
unbroken sequence of events. Following the claimant to the forecourt was all part of a seamless 
episode. Further, when the employee again told the claimant in threatening words that he was never to 
come back to the petrol station, this was not something personal between them; it was an order to keep 
away from his employer’s premises, which he reinforced by violence. In giving such an order he was 
purporting to act about his employer’s business. It was a gross abuse of his position, but it was in 
connection with the business in which he was employed to serve customers. His employers entrusted 
him with that position and it was just that as between them and the claimant, they should be held 
responsible for their employee’s abuse of it. The employee’s motive was irrelevant. It looked obvious 
that he was motivated by personal racism rather than a desire to benefit his employer’s business, but 
that was neither here nor there. 
Lord Dyson also was happy with the “close connection” test.85 He recognised that it was imprecise. But 
this was an area of the law in which imprecision was inevitable. To search for certainty and precision in 
                                                          
81 [2016] UKSC 11, [2016] 2 WLR 821, at [26]-[39]. His Lordship was critical of Deatons Pty Ltd v Flew (1949) 79 
CLR 370 and Keppel Bus Co Ltd v Ahmed [1974] 1 WLR 1082, both declining liability. He preferred the result, 
although not necessarily the reasoning, in Petterson v Royal Oak Hotel Ltd [1948] NZLR 136, allowing the claim. 
82 Citing Central Motors (Glasgow) Ltd v Cessnock Garage and Motor Co 1925 SC 796, 802 per Lord Cullen. 
83 Citing Rose v Plenty [1976] 1 WLR 141, 147-8 per Scarman LJ. 
84 [2016] UKSC 11, [2016] 2 WLR 821, at [43]-[47]. 
85 Ibid, at [53]-[56]. 
  
vicarious liability was to undertake a quest for a chimaera. Many aspects of the law of torts were 
inherently imprecise, such as the concepts of fairness, justice and reasonableness which were central 
to the law of negligence. The second limb of the Salmond test was not effective for determining the 
circumstances in which it was just to hold an employer vicariously liable for committing an act not 
authorised by the employer, and the necessary improvement in the law was achieved by the simple 
expedient of explicitly incorporating the concept of justice into the close connection test. 
No doubt their Lordships are correct in drawing attention to the uncertainties. The wider approach 
seems to ask whether, in some fairly broad sense, the employee (or person in an analogous position) 
is in fact performing his or her employment or similar task at the time of the wrongful act and whether 
there is a connection with the task beyond the mere coincidence of time and place which meant that 
the wrongful act happened to occur at the workplace. We might ask whether the employment created 
a risk of “this sort of thing”. The inquiry has some affinity with the question whether conduct can be said 
to be the cause of loss where it is precipitated by an intervening act or event. As has been judicially 
remarked, there is a material, and crucial, distinction between causing a loss and providing the 
opportunity for its continuance.86 A helpful method of approach in drawing this distinction is to ask 
whether the plaintiff’s loss is within the scope of the risk created by the defendant’s conduct.87  In the 
present context we must ask whether the employment or task created the risk of the conduct: and in 
Mohamud the Supreme Court held that it did because the employment involved dealing with customers 
and the assault occurred as part of that dealing. However, in Prince Alfred88 the High Court of Australia 
rejected the decision, because the role assigned to the employee in that case did not provide the 
occasion for the wrongful acts which the employee committed outside the kiosk on the forecourt of the 
petrol station. What occurred after the victim left the kiosk was relevantly unconnected with the 
employee's employment.   
We can perhaps agree with the High Court on this point. It is hard to see the racist assault as being 
connected with the wrongdoer’s employment. The Supreme Court emphasised that what occurred was 
a “seamless” series of events, but the whole episode, including the initial encounter in the kiosk, very 
arguably was attributable simply to the employee’s racism, not his employment. Let us change the facts 
and suppose the employee saw a Somali man passing in the street and ran out and assaulted him for 
racist reasons.  The result seemingly would have been different, yet there does not appear to be any 
substantive difference as regards the connection with his employment. As it stands the decision in 
Mohamud seems apt, or at least has the potential, to render an employer liable for anything an 
employee may do at work and on the employer’s premises.   
This is not to say that the close connection test must be narrowly based, applying only to abuse or 
analogous cases. Rather, it can apply generally to situations involving intentional misconduct and, 
indeed, to cases of negligence. Asking whether there is a “close connection” between a certain 
relationship and the tortious conduct of a party to that relationship certainly can include the question 
whether the conduct occurred within the course or scope of the relationship. But let us focus on 
intentional conduct and consider how the test ought to be applied in the conjoined, and contrasting, 
decisions in Weddall v Barchester Health Care Ltd and Wallbank v Wallbank Fox Designs Ltd.89 In 
Weddall, the manager of a care home phoned a junior employee at his home to offer him a voluntary 
extra shift, but the employee, having formed the impression that he was being mocked because he was 
drunk, cycled to the home and attacked the manager in a violent and unprovoked attack. In Wallbank, 
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a director employed by the defendant, a small manufacturing company, spoke to an employee about 
shortcomings in his work and went to assist him, but the employee threw him onto a table and fractured 
his lower back. The Court of Appeal held that the claim of vicarious liability failed in the first case but 
succeeded in the second.  
Pill LJ, delivering the main judgment (Moore-Bick LJ and Aikens LJ both agreeing), said that the 
essence of the appellants’ cases was that, since employees had to receive instructions and respond to 
them, an improper form of response, even a violent one, was an act within the course of employment. 
Yet in Weddall the assault was an independent venture of the employee, separate and distinct from his 
employment at the care home. He was acting personally for his own reasons. The instruction, or request 
as in fact it was, was no more than a pretext for an act of violence unconnected with his work as a 
health assistant. However, in Wallbank the risk of an over-robust reaction to an instruction was a risk 
created by the employment. It might be reasonably incidental to the employment rather than unrelated 
to or independent of it. Not every act of violence by a junior to a more senior employee, in response to 
an instruction at the workplace, would be an act for which the employer was vicariously liable. But on 
the particular facts the doctrine of vicarious liability did provide the victim with a right of action against 
his employer. 
Should the close connection test be seen as satisfied in either Weddall or Wallbank? The reasoning in 
Mohamud, irrespective of the actual decision, tells us that we should look to the field of activities 
entrusted to the employee and the link with or the kind of risk associated with that field. In Wallbank the 
factors that were regarded as relevant included the geographical and temporal proximity of the assault 
to the order. It may be argued that reliance on factors such as these seems arbitrary, for they suggest 
that the position might be different if an employee developed resentment as a result of work orders but 
assaulted his superior away from the workplace. Yet maybe the decision would be the same, provided 
the link with work orders could be shown.90 And maybe the test was not satisfied in Weddall, on the 
ground that the assault appeared to be motivated by personal resentment and that it lacked any 
sufficient link with the employment. Certainly, in a decision in Scotland,91 an employer was not 
vicariously liable where an employee was murdered by a co-employee, for the field of employment did 
not create the risk of the murderous conduct. 
Predicting the closeness of the connection between the relationship and the conduct on the facts of any 
particular case often will not be an easy task for lawyers, nor will determining it be easy for the courts. 
Some uncertainty in the application of the test is inevitable. However, in one respect at least the law is 
clearer and, maybe, more principled. The nature of the inquiry is very well suited to give a remedy in 
sexual abuse cases and other cases involving vulnerable claimants. As regards the former, the 
decisions emphasise that the risk of the abuse must arise out of the activities and duties entrusted to 
the wrongdoer: it is not enough that the activities and duties simply provided an opportunity for the 
abuse to occur. As regards the latter, and looking at the question more broadly, the relevant risk can 
most easily be seen to arise in circumstances where the victim is in a vulnerable position and, in 
particular, subject to the exercise of power by the wrongdoer. Indeed, we can also see this underlying 
theme in the different context of employees or agents vested with authority to effect legal relations on 
behalf of employers or principals or their clients. 
Where an employee has been guilty of fraudulent wrongdoing which is intended only to benefit the 
employee, albeit carried out in the course of the employee’s normal duties, once again there is a 
difficulty in such cases in finding that the wrongful conduct occurred in the course of employment. Yet 
the courts have consistently imposed vicarious liability on the employer. In Lloyd v Grace, Smith & Co,92 
the leading decision, an employee who was employed by a solicitor as a conveyancing manager, and 
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who was vested with authority to arrange and negotiate sales of real property, fraudulently induced the 
plaintiff to convey her property to him. The plaintiff was under the impression that she was executing 
documents which were necessary to sell the properties on her behalf to others. The House of Lords 
held unanimously that the defendants were vicariously liable. Lord Macnaghten was satisfied, relying 
on earlier authority,93 that the principles of agency could apply and that a principal who was an employer 
was liable for the fraud of his agent and employee committed in the course of the agent’s employment 
and within his authority, whether the fraud was committed for the benefit of the principal or not. 
Lord Toulson discussed Lloyd’s case in Mohamud,94 observing that Lord Macnaghten recognised the 
difficulty of trying to give precise meaning to the expressions “acting within his authority”, “acting in the 
course of his employment” and “acting within the scope of his agency”, and that whichever expression 
was used it had to be construed liberally. Lord Toulson himself said that although taking properties from 
the plaintiff was far removed from what the wrongdoer was employed to do, the justice of the decision 
was obvious. The wrongdoer was trusted both by his firm and by its client. They were each innocent, 
but one of them had to bear the loss, and it was right that it should be the employer. The firm employed 
the wrongdoer and placed him in a position to deal with the claimant; he abused that position and took 
advantage of her. It was fairer that the firm should suffer for the cheating by their employee than the 
client who was cheated. 
It is immediately apparent that the vulnerability of the client can be seen as driving the decision. She 
was subject to the power of the fraudulent clerk and was obliged to trust him regarding the sale of her 
property and the execution of the necessary documents. And while it is difficult to see the conduct of 
the clerk as being within his authority or the scope of his employment, in recent cases the difficulty in 
finding the necessary link with the employment has been resolved by importing the close connection 
test. In Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam95 the House of Lords applied the Lister approach to vicarious 
liability in the case of commercial fraud. Lord Nicholls said that “the wrongful conduct should be so 
closely connected with acts the partner or employee was authorised to do that, for the purpose of the 
liability of the firm or the employer to third parties, the wrongful act might fairly and properly be regarded 
[original emphasis] as done by the partner while acting in the ordinary course of the firm’s business or 
the employee’s employment”.96  
In Nathan v Dollars & Sense Ltd,97 the leading case in New Zealand, the Supreme Court accepted that 
vicarious liability could apply to an agency relationship not involving employment, and applied the close 
connection test in determining the scope of liability. Here a borrower (R) sought to arrange a loan from 
a financier (D) to fund his business, with his parents’ property being used as security. D’s lawyer asked 
R to obtain his parents’ signatures and to carry out other tasks in relation to the security on D’s behalf. 
R forged his mother’s signature, following which the mortgage was registered and the loan moneys 
advanced. R’s business later was placed in liquidation, and D sought to enforce its security. The 
Supreme Court recognised that it could not be said that borrowers could never act as agents for lenders. 
Here R had been entrusted with the task of obtaining the signatures and was D’s agent for that purpose, 
having been impliedly authorised to act in a representative capacity. Whether a principal was liable for 
an agent’s conduct depended upon whether the conduct fell within the scope of the task the agent had 
been engaged to perform. There needed to be a sufficiently close connection between that task and 
the agent’s unlawful act, so that the wrong could be seen as the materialisation of the risk inherent in 
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the task. And on the facts the conduct was within the scope of the agency, even though the forgery was 
done exclusively for the benefit of the agent. 
As the above discussion makes apparent, the vicarious liability of principals for the conduct of agents 
is determined in a similar way to that of employers or of those who are analogous to employers for the 
conduct of employees or persons in analogous positions. Vicarious liability is imposed because, broadly 
speaking, the employee or agent is acting in a representative capacity and performing his or her 
allocated tasks, albeit fraudulently. 
Alleging a non-delegable duty 
Let us consider a few basic points. A person who employs an independent contractor (who we will call 
the principal) is not liable for the independent contractor’s negligence in the course of his or her work. 
The same policy considerations which underpin the vicarious liability of an employer for an employee’s 
negligence, such as the requirements of efficiency, risk allocation and loss-spreading, are seen to justify 
the imposition of liability for the independent contractor’s negligence squarely on the contractor 
concerned, who can pass on any relevant costs (such as insurance) in the price for the job. Of course, 
the principal may always breach a primary duty of care owed to others and arising from damage caused 
by the contractor’s work. In this event, the principal will be liable as a joint tortfeasor. The clearest 
examples are cases where the principal hires an independent contractor to commit an act which is in 
itself tortious or intervenes to give the contractor a direct instruction which causes the damage. Or 
sometimes there may be a duty to control or to supervise.98 Other examples arise where the principal 
should reasonably have foreseen that damage could occur when hiring an independent contractor who 
is known to the principal to be incompetent,99 where the work involves specialised skill the principal 
should know the independent contractor does not possess,100 or where the principal discovers the 
contractor carrying out work in a foreseeably injurious way and does nothing to prevent it.101 
This brings us to the concept of a non-delegable duty, which tends to cut across the above principles. 
Since, in strict terms, a person under a duty to use care cannot delegate that duty to someone else,102 
the creation of a class of non-delegable duties seems to be self-contradictory.103 However, the category 
is well established, if indeterminate, and is generally associated with relationships which give rise to a 
duty of care “of a special and ‘more stringent’ kind, namely a ‘duty to ensure that reasonable care is 
taken’”.104 In other words, non-delegable means that legal responsibility cannot be delegated, even if a 
task itself has been. In Woodland v Essex County Council,105 Lord Sumption said that English law had 
long recognised that non-delegable duties exist, but did not have a single theory to explain when or 
why. However, his Lordship identified two broad categories of case in which such a duty had been held 
to arise.106 
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Extra-hazardous activities 
The first concerned so-called “extra-hazardous activities”.107 Many of the decisions in which a non-
delegable duty has been held to arise concern defendants who have allowed their land or premises to 
be used in a way which poses a danger to others, while at the same time being in a position to insist 
that reasonable care be exercised. So in Black v Christchurch Finance Co Ltd,108 an independent 
contractor negligently lit a fire on the defendant's land so as to burn off bush. The fire spread to the 
plaintiff's land. Notwithstanding an assumption by the Privy Council that the contractor lit the fire in 
breach of contract, which had specified that burning should take place at a favourable time, the 
defendant was held to be liable. The basis of this decision was that, in the context of dangerous activity 
on its land, the defendant had been under a non-delegable duty to "use all reasonable precautions”. 
But it is not easy to understand how an activity can be classified as carrying inherent risk independently 
of the precautions taken to minimise the risk. Indeed, the principle has been judicially described as 
anomalous and unsatisfactory, to be applied as narrowly as possible.109 In Woodland Lord Sumption 
described this category as varied and anomalous, adding that many of the decisions were founded on 
arbitrary distinctions between ordinary and extraordinary hazards which might be ripe for re-
examination. He thought that their justification, if there was one, should probably be found in a special 
rule of public policy for operations involving exceptional danger to the public. But it is by no means 
obvious that the courts should strain to retain the principle, and very arguably it ought to be abandoned 
completely. 
Protective relationships 
Given his doubts about the first, Lord Sumption’s second category accordingly lies at the heart of the 
concept of a non-delegable duty as he saw it.110 His Lordship said that it comprised cases where the 
common law imposed a duty upon the defendant which had three critical characteristics. First, the duty 
arose not from the negligent character of the act itself but because of an antecedent relationship 
between the defendant and the claimant. Second, the duty was a positive or affirmative duty to protect 
a particular class of persons against a particular class of risks, and not simply a duty to refrain from 
acting in a way that foreseeably caused injury. Third, the duty was by virtue of that relationship personal 
to the defendant. The work required to perform such a duty might well be delegable, and usually was. 
But the duty itself remained the defendant's. His Lordship observed that in these cases the defendant 
was assuming a liability analogous to that assumed by a person who contracted to do work carefully. 
The contracting party would normally be taken to contract that the work would be done carefully by 
whomever he might get to do it.111 Likewise, in certain tort cases, the defendant could be taken not just 
to have assumed a positive duty, but to have assumed responsibility for the exercise of due care by 
anyone to whom he may have delegated its performance. 
Five factors were identified by Lord Sumption in establishing a personal duty of this kind.112 They were 
the vulnerability of the claimant, the existence of a relationship between the claimant and the defendant 
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by virtue of which the defendant had a degree of protective custody and control over the claimant, the 
claimant having no control over how the defendant chose to perform its obligations, the delegation of 
that custody and control to another person, and negligence by that person in the performance of the 
very function assumed by the defendant and delegated to him or her. A clear instance was the non-
delegable duty of an employer to maintain a safe system of work,113 and in his Lordship’s opinion the 
time had come to recognise that the relationships between hospitals and their patients,114 and local 
education authorities and their pupils115 fell into the same category. In Woodland itself, applying the 
above principles, the duty of a local education authority was held to be non-delegable in circumstances 
where a pupil suffered serious injury in the course of a school swimming lesson conducted by swimming 
instructors provided by an independent contractor at a pool run by another local authority.116 
Pretty clearly the factors identified by Lord Sumption point directly towards a non-delegable duty to 
protect vulnerable persons. In essence, the duty arises out of an assumption of protective control by 
the defendant, and a lack of control and lack of an ability to take self-protective measures by the plaintiff. 
Indeed, his Lordship said that other examples were likely to be prisoners and residents in care homes,117 
bearing out this argument. Both are placed in situations where they are highly vulnerable to harm or 
abuse. 
Vicarious liability or non-delegable duty? 
We are in a position now to consider how the principles governing vicarious liability and those governing 
the imposition of a non-delegable duty relate to each other and to contrast how the vulnerability of 
plaintiffs might bear upon liability under each. In the case of vicarious liability the focus is on the 
relationship between the defendant and the wrongdoer, whereas in the case of a non-delegable duty 
the focus is on a protective relationship assumed by a defendant over a vulnerable plaintiff. Sometimes 
it is apparent that the principles can overlap. This will or may be so in a sexual abuse case where 
vicarious liability is imposed on a defendant for the conduct of an employee or of a person in a position 
“akin to employment” and there is a close connection between the creation or enhancement of a risk 
inherent in the defendant’s enterprise and the wrongdoing in question. In Lister, for example, the school 
could have been held to have been under a non-delegable duty, unless the view is taken that a non-
delegable duty cannot apply in the case of an intentional tort.118 But it is difficult to see why there should 
be a distinction between a failure to take care by carelessness and by intentional conduct.119 However, 
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while both may operate to protect vulnerable persons, the foundation for the imposition of liability is 
different. Seemingly Christian Brothers could not have been argued as a case of a non-delegable duty, 
unless the De La Salle Institute could be treated as having assumed a degree of protective custody 
over the claimant (and having delegated performance to its brothers). But, on the face of it, no such 
relationship existed, the claimant being in fact in the custody of the Middlesbrough defendants.120 On 
the other hand, Woodland clearly could not be argued as a case of vicarious liability, which cannot 
extend to the conduct of independent contractors.121 
In the New Zealand decision in S v Attorney-General122 the Court of Appeal held that the Crown was 
vicariously liable in respect of abuse committed by foster parents on a foster child placed with those 
parents by the New Zealand Department of Social Welfare (DSW). The majority view was that the foster 
parents were the agents of the DSW, albeit that the agency was of an unusual, indeed, unique, nature. 
However, applying the approach in Christian Brothers, this does not look like a case of vicarious liability, 
for there was no relationship “akin to employment” between the DSW and foster parents. Indeed, foster 
parents are expected to act as natural parents, with the independence that that role entails, and this is 
the view that has been taken in the Supreme Court of Canada.123 Even so, it might be argued that the 
DSW was under a non-delegable duty vis-a-vis the plaintiff, having assumed a positive duty to protect 
the vulnerable plaintiff from harm. Yet recent authority in the United Kingdom must throw doubt on this 
conclusion. 
The question arose in NA v Nottingham County Council,124 where the Court of Appeal of England and 
Wales held that a local authority was not vicariously liable for the abusive acts of foster parents, because 
there was no relationship akin to employment and because the provision of family life by foster parents 
was not and could not be part of the activity or enterprise of the local authority.125 It also held, for differing 
reasons, that no non-delegable duty could be imposed.126 Tomlinson LJ maintained that in order to be 
non-delegable a duty had to relate to a function which the purported delegator, here the local authority, 
had assumed for itself to perform. Fostering was an activity which the authority had to entrust to others. 
By arranging the foster placement, the authority discharged rather than delegated its duty to provide 
accommodation and maintenance for the child. Burnett LJ took the view that there could be no non-
delegable duty to found a cause of action for an assault, as opposed to negligence. If, applying the 
principles summarised in the Christian Brothers case (with their carefully calibrated policy 
considerations) there was no vicarious liability for an assault upon a child in care, the common law 
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should not impose liability via this different route.127 Black LJ, like Males J at first instance,128 held that 
no non-delegable duty should be imposed, even though the Woodland features were present, on the 
ground that it would not be fair, just and reasonable to do so. Key reasons were that it would impose 
an unreasonable financial burden on local authorities and would be likely to provoke the channelling of 
even more of the local authorities’ scarce resources into attempting to ensure that nothing went wrong 
and, if possible, insuring against potential liability; there was a fear that it would lead to defensive 
practice in relation to the placement of children, who might be placed in local authority run homes 
instead in order that the authority could exert greater control over their day-to-day care; it would be 
difficult to draw a principled distinction between liability for abuse committed by foster parents and 
liability for abuse committed by others with whom a local authority decided to place a child, including its 
own parents; and a parent would not have a strict liability for harm caused by someone to whom he or 
she had entrusted the child’s care, such as a nanny or friends or relations, and it was difficult to see 
why the local authority’s liability should be more onerous. 
Black LJ’s opinion in NA that Lord Sumption’s five indicia for the instant form of non-delegable duty 
were satisfied certainly is supportable. The first two were accepted by the local authority, and the third 
— lack of control by the child — also was met. Contrary to Tomlinson LJ’s view, the fourth — delegation 
of a function which was an integral part of the assumed duty — arguably was present, as the local 
authority had delegated the obligation to care for a child as a parent or guardian would. The fifth — 
negligence in the performance of the very function that was assumed by the defendant and delegated 
to another — arguably was satisfied as well. Burnett LJ’s opinion that deliberate assaults could not 
involve any breach of delegated duty is not especially convincing. If, as has been suggested, the focus 
of this form of non-delegable duty is the relationship between the defendant and the victim of harm, 
then it should not matter how the duty to see that reasonable care is taken of the victim was breached, 
whether through carelessness or intentional act of the wrongdoer. Indeed, it creates a perverse 
incentive to defendants to plead that conduct was intentional rather than negligent in order to avoid the 
imposition of the duty. So we are left with the view that it was not fair, just and reasonable in all the 
circumstances to impose a non-delegable duty. This involves a weighing of the policy implications, and 
these certainly can point both ways. In NA v Nottingham County Council the duty was established by 
statute and was different in nature to that in Woodland, and the policy objections to a non-delegable 
duty in respect of wrongdoing by foster parents, thought to be decisive by Black LJ, and supported by 
Tomlinson and Burnett LJ, seemingly should prevail.129 But outside that particular context the Woodland 
principles usually will apply. 
Conclusions 
A number of key points arise out of the preceding discussion. First, the courts can and do take into 
account a principle involving the vulnerability of a victim when deciding whether to impose a personal 
duty on a defendant to intervene to protect the victim from harm at the hands of others. Second, a need 
to protect vulnerable people is prominent in the thinking behind the recent decisions widening the rules 
governing the imposition of vicarious liability for the wrongdoing of another. The relationship factor, now 
extended in Canada and the United Kingdom to include a relationship analogous to employment, 
coupled with the need to show a close connection between the relationship and the wrongdoing, 
together are well suited for the purpose. Indeed, the two limbs are intimately related and may 
conveniently be expressed as one. As Tipping J has observed in a decision in New Zealand,130 a 
judgment must be made as to whether, in light of all relevant features of the relationship in issue, the 
law should or should not impose vicarious liability for misconduct which has a sufficient connection with 
and is within the risks created by the relationship. Third, the core rules articulated and applied in 
Woodland for determining whether a defendant should be fixed with a non-delegable duty with respect 
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to the performance of a task by an independent contractor are aimed directly at providing a remedy for 
vulnerable persons. Lord Sumption’s focus on the critical importance of the defendant having assumed 
an antecedent protective relationship certainly means that the plaintiff can reasonably expect the 
defendant to be responsible for his or her welfare. 
In these various respects the law has been developing in directions that very arguably accord with the 
ethos of the day. No doubt that is indeed what the courts normally strive to do. 
 
 
 
 
